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UNDERSTANDING THE SHORT HISTORY
OF PLEA BARGAINING
JOHN H. LANGBEIN
As late as the eighteenth century, ordinary jury trial at common
law was a judge-dominated, lawyer-free procedure conducted so rap-
idly that plea bargaining was unnecessary. Thereafter, the rise of ad-
versary procedure and the law of evidence injected vast complexity
into jury trial and made it unworkable as a routine dispositive proce-
dure. A variety of factors, some quite fortuitous, inclined nineteenth-
century common law procedure to channel the mounting caseload into
nontrial plea bargaining procedure rather than to refine its trial proce-
dure as contemporary Continental legal systems were doing.
Alschuler (supra) has undertaken to document that plea
bargaining was unknown during most of the history of the com-
mon law. Only in the nineteenth century does he find signifi-
cant evidence of the practice in either England or America.
These findings beckon to the legal historian for explanation. In
modern times, plea bargaining has become the primary proce-
dure through which we dispose of the vast proportion of cases
of serious crime. How then could common law procedure func-
tion for so many centuries without l a practice that is today so
prevalent and seemingly so indispensable?
I. WHAT IS PLEA BARGAINING?
In aid of historical inquiry it will be convenient to empha-
size some essential features of the modern plea bargaining sys-
tem.
(1) Plea bargaining is a nontrial mode of procedure.
(2) This nontrial procedure subverts the design of our
Constitution, which provides that "[i)n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial . . . by an
impartial jury ..." (U.S. Const. amend. VI, emphasis sup-
plied).2
(3) In order to displace the constitutional design and sub-
stitute our nontrial procedure for the trial procedure envisaged
by the framers, we make it costly for a criminal accused to
Suggestions and references supplied by Albert Alschuler (Colorado),
Thomas Green (Michigan), Norval Morris (Chicago), William Nelson (Yale),
and Franklin Zimring (Chicago) are gratefully acknowledged.
1 But see the discussion in note 11, infra.
2 In Duncan v. Louisiana the Supreme Court held "that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were
they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee" (391 U.S. 145, 149, 1968).
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claim his constitutional right. When an accused is convicted
following jury trial, we customarily punish him twice: once for
the crime, and then more severely for "enjoy[ing] the right to
... trial ... by an impartial jury ...." We rely upon the de-
terrent effect of that practice to dissuade other defendants from
claiming their right to jury trial.
(4) This nontrial procedure has serious drawbacks. In
particular, the accused cannot present defenses and have his
guilt proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt-his greatest
safeguard against mistaken conviction.
(5) Nevertheless, on account of its efficiency, plea bar-
gaining has won the endorsement of the Supreme Court as "an
essential component of the administration of justice"
(Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 1971). Chief Justice
Burger explained there that plea bargaining "is to be en-
couraged" because "fi]f every criminal charge were subjected
to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government
would need to multiply by many times the number of judges
and court facilities."
II. NONADVERSARIAL JURY TRIAL
The main historical explanation for the want of plea bar-
gaining in former centuries is, I believe, simple and incon-
trovertible. When we turn back to the period before the middle
of the eighteenth century, we find that common law trial proce-
dure exhibited a degree of efficiency that we now expect only
of our nontrial procedure. Jury trial was a summary proceed-
ing. Over the intervening two centuries the rise of the adver-
sary system and the related development of the law of evidence
has caused common law jury trial to undergo a profound trans-
formation, robbing it of the wondrous efficiency that had char-
acterized it for so many centuries.
The initial point to grasp, and then to explain, is how rap-
idly jury trials were conducted. The surviving sources show
that well into the eighteenth century when the Old Bailey sat,
it tried between twelve and twenty felony cases per day
(Langbein, 1978:277), and provincial assizes operated with simi-
lar dispatch (Beattie, 1977:165). Indeed, it was not until 1794
that a trial "ever lasted for more than one day, and [in that
case] the court seriously considered whether it had any power
to adjourn. . . ."3
3 Mackinnon (1933:307) referring to R. v. Thomas Hardy (24 St. Tr. 19,
1794). Mackinnon is speaking only of common law trials; some Parliamentary
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How could the Old Bailey of the 1730s process a dozen and
more cases to full jury trial in one day, whereas in modern
times the average jury trial requires several days of court
time?4
(1) The most important factor that expedited jury trial
was the want of counsel. Neither prosecution nor defense was
represented in ordinary criminal trials. The accused was for-
bidden counsel; the prosecution might be conducted by a law-
yer, but in practice virtually never was. The victim or other
complaining witness, sometimes aided by the lay constable and
the lay justice of the peace, performed the role we now assign
to the public prosecutor, gathering evidence and presenting it
at trial.5 As a result, jury trial was not yet protracted by the
motions, maneuvers, and speeches of counsel that afflict the
modern trial.
(2) There was, for example, no voir dire of prospective ju-
rors conducted by counsel. In practice the accused took the
jury as he found it and virtually never employed his challenge
rights. Indeed, at the Old Bailey only two twelve-man jury
panels were used to discharge the entire caseload of as many
as a hundred felony trials in a few days. Each jury usually
heard several unrelated cases before deliberating on any.
Often the juries rendered verdicts in these cases of life and
death "at the bar," that is, so rapidly that they did not even re-
tire from the courtroom to deliberate (Langbein, 1978:280, 284;
cf. Beattie, 1977:174).
(3) The most efficient testimonial resource available to a
criminal court is almost always the criminal defendant. He has,
after all, been close enough to the events to get himself prose-
cuted. In modern Anglo-American procedure we have con-
structed the privilege against self-incrimination in a way that
often encourages the accused to rely entirely upon the interme-
diation of counsel and say nothing in his own defense. But in
the period before the accused had counsel, there could be no
and other irregular proceedings before 1794 lasted more than a day, such as the
"trial" of Charles I (4 St. Tr. 990, 1649).
4 In the District of Columbia, the length of the average felony trial in-
creased from 1.9 days in 1950 to 2.8 days in 1965 (President's Commission on
Crime in the District of Columbia, 1966:263). A few years later, the figure was
"well over three days" (Hearings on District of Columbia Appropriations, 90th
Cong., 1st sess., 1967) (statement of United States Attorney David G. Bress;
figures include both bench and jury trials). In Los Angeles, the length of the
average felony jury trial is said to have increased from 3.5 days in 1964 to 7.2
days in 1968 (San Francisco Committee on Crime, 1970:1). (I am grateful to
Professor Albert W. Alschuler for supplying these references.)
5 This is discussed further in the text, infra:266-67; cf. Langbein (1978:280-
82, 311-13; 1973:315-24).
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practical distinction between his roles as defender and as wit-
ness. The accused spoke continuously at the trial, replying to
prosecution witnesses and giving his own version of the events
(Langbein, 1978:282-84).
(4) The presentation of evidence and the cross-examina-
tion of witnesses and accused took place in a fashion that was
businesslike but lacked the time-consuming stiffness of a mod-
ern adversary trial, which has strict rules of sequence and
phase preclusion. The trial judge superintended this "alterca-
tion" (Smith, 1583:80) of witnesses and accused, occasionally
examining or cross-examining, and he exercised a broad power
of comment upon the evidence (Langbein, 1978:284,285-87).
(5) The common law of evidence, which has injected such
vast complexity into modern criminal trials, was virtually non-
existent as late as the opening decades of the eighteenth cen-
tury (Langbein, 1978:300-6; cf. Wigmore, 1908:696). The trial
judge had an alternative system of jury control that was both
swifter and surer than the subsequent resort to rules of admis-
sibility and exclusion. He had unrestricted powers of comment
on the merits of criminal cases; he could reject a verdict that
displeased him and require the jury to deliberate further; in-
deed, until 1670 he could fine a jury that persisted in acquitting
against his wishes (Langbein, 1978:284-300).
(6) In an age before professional police and prosecutors,
the problems of controlling such officers and protecting the ac-
cused from abuse of their powers lay wholly in the future. The
remarkable American exercise of attempting to substitute ex-
clusionary rules of evidence for a direct system of discipline
was not yet operating to protract the criminal process.
(7) Finally, there was as yet virtually no appeal in crimi-
nal cases.6 Accordingly, the familiar modern machinations of
counsel directed to provoking and preserving error for appeal
were unknown.
It should surprise no one that in a system of trial as rough
and rapid as this there was no particular pressure to develop
nontrial procedure, or otherwise to encourage the accused to
waive his right to jury trial. Indeed, the sources reveal an oppo-
site pressure, which we find confirmed by Sir Matthew Hale, a
trial judge of long experience, in his Pleas of the Crown, written
in 1670. He reports that "it is usual" for the judge to discourage
.an accused from pleading guilty, and "to advise the party to
6 This explains, in part, the prominence of the pardon as an alternative
scheme of review, see Hay (1975:40-49); Radzinowicz (1948:107-37).
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plead [not guiltyI and put himself upon his trial
(1736:225) .
We should also not be surprised that this summary form of
jury trial perished over the last two centuries. The level of
safeguard against mistaken conviction was in several respects
below what civilized peoples now require. The hard question,
which remains unresearched, is why the pressure for greater
safeguard led in the Anglo-American procedure to the common
law of evidence and dominance of the trial by lawyers, reforms
that ultimately destroyed the system in the sense that they
rendered trials unworkable as an ordinary or routine disposi-
tive procedure for cases of serious crime. Similar pressures for
safeguard were being felt in the Continental legal systems in
the same period, but they led to reforms in nonadversarial pro-
cedure that preserved the institution of trial.
III. WHY PLEA BARGAINING?
We think that we understand why there w"as no plea bar-
gaining while jury trial retained its character as a summary
proceeding. And we have no difficulty seeing that once jury
trial had been overlaid with the complexity that characterizes it
today, it could no longer be used as the exclusive dispositive
proceeding for cases of serious crime.7 But these insights leave
us still a good distance from explaining why the particular ad-
aptation that resulted was plea bargaining. Too little is known
about the detail of the transformation of eighteenth-century
summary jury trial into twentieth-century adversary jury trial
to permit us to speak with precision about how the response of
plea bargaining took shape. We may, however, indicate some
features of the earlier system of jury trial that predisposed
Anglo-American procedure to plea bargaining.
7 In isolating the transformation of jury trial as the root cause of plea bar-
gaining, I do not mean to imply that this procedural development is the sole
cause of a practice so complex. When the history of plea bargaining is ulti-
mately written, there will certainly be other chapters. In particular, it will be
necessary to investigate: the influence of the rise of professional policing and
prosecution and the accompanying changes in the levels of crime reporting and
detection; changes in the social composition of victim and offender groups;
changes in the rates and types of crime; and the intellectual influence of the
marketplace model in an age when laissez faire was not an epithet. But these
other phenomena were largely experienced in Continental countries that did
not turn to plea bargaining. Anyone looking beyond the uniquely Anglo-Ameri-
can procedural development that we have emphasized needs to explain why
plea bargaining has characterized lands with such disparate social composition
as the United States and England, but not Germany, France, or the other major
European states.
HeinOnline -- 13 Law & Soc’y Rev. 266 1978-1979
266 13 LAW & SOCIETY / WINTER 1979
A. Private Prosecution
The tradition of private prosecution has been a feature of
English criminal procedure nearly as striking and tenacious as
the jury trial. To this day the English are as reluctant to admit
that the tradition of private prosecution has been eroded as
they are to concede that they have largely displaced jury trial
by plea bargaining (Baldwin and McConville, infra). In theory,
private prosecution continues to be the norm. Official prosecu-
tion is formally limited to the handful of cases brought by the
Director of Public Prosecutions. Otherwise, the police are said
to prosecute. Further, "[w] hen 'the police' prosecute, the cor-
rect analysis is that some individual has instituted proceedings,
and the fact that this individual is a police officer does not alter
the nature of the prosecution" (Jackson, 1972:155).
Writing in 1860, when the transition to an adversary jury
trial was well underway, Stephen emphasized the persistence
of this peculiar tradition of private prosecution in a most useful
passage:
In this country, though probably this country only, the result of the ex-
perience of nearly eight centuries has been to establish the principles
that a criminal trial differs from a civil action principally in the charac-
ter of the damages ultimately awarded. In the one case a man is tried
for the sake of exacting from him his life or his liberty, as in the other
case he is sued for the sake of exacting from him satisfaction for the
breach of an obligation, or for the infliction of an injury.... There is
no public functionary whose duty it is to investigate the charges and to
obtain and arrange the evidence required to support them. The prose-
cutor is generally a private person, and has never, as such, any official
authority. He employs his own attorney just as he would in a civil ac-
tion, and he is practically the dominus litis. [Stephen, 1860:697-98]
By analogizing the private prosecutor to the dominus litis
of civil litigation, Stephen reminds us of the civil litigant's right
to compromise his claim. Although the English did place some
limits upon the power of the private prosecutor to compromise
criminal litigation,8 the prosecutorial function nevertheless
grew up steeped in the conceptual forms of private discretion
8 Compounding a felony for gain without leave of court was itself crimi-
nal, see Stephen (1883:501-2). The pretrial procedure instituted by the Marian
committal statute (1555, 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10) authorized the justice of the
peace (hereafter JP) to bind over the private prosecutor and other accusing
witnesses, that is, to require them to sign recognizances by whose terms they
would, in the event of nonappearance at trial, forfeit the sums specified in the
respective instruments. These powers led some JPs to take a more active role
in investigating and prosecuting difficult or important cases, see Langbein
(1973:317-24).
The surviving sources suggest that in London in the early eighteenth cen-
tury certain of the JPs were already quasi-professionals at investigation and
prosecution, and that they were already employing a technique of negotiated
nonprosecution much older than plea bargaining. They could grant immunity
from prosecution to a culprit who "made himself an evidence" against other
criminals. See, for example, the trial testimony of a JP (Gwyn Vaughan) ex-
plaining how he chose among competing applications of a group of shoplifters
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as opposed to official duty.9 Even in America, where the public
prosecutor has a longer history than in the mother jurisdiction
(Wisconsin Law Review, 1952), the district attorney fell heir to
the discretion of the citizen prosecutor whom he succeeded.
When, therefore, the transformation of jury trial left the trial
system clogged, the pressure of caseloads could find release in
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion much more naturally
than on the Continent, where the prosecutorial function has for
so long been performed by officials and where there has been
constant concern to regulate their discretion (Langbein,
1974:442-43, 448-50).
B. The Guilty Plea
Stephen's analogy to the civil dominus litis is also impor-
tant in thinking about the position of the criminal defendant.
For many centuries he, too, has had the civil litigant's right to
concede liability without trial, through the use of the guilty
plea. This device, now familiar to us as the doctrinal basis of
our nontrial plea bargaining procedure, also turns out to be an
Anglo-American peculiarity. In Continental legal systems
someone who is accused of a serious crime may confess, but he
will nevertheless go to trial. Confession shortens the trial by
affecting the quality of the evidence, but confession does not
eliminate triaLlO For most purposes it hardly mattered that the
wanting to become this so-called crown witness, in The Proceedings at the Ses-
sions of the Peace, and Oyer and Terminer, for the City of London and County
of Middlesex (Aug.-Sept. 1726) at 4.
Writers have been known to confuse this practice with plea bargaining, e.g.,
Buffalo Law Review (1974), properly criticized on this ground by Friedman
(supra:247). The confusion is understandable. The crown witness typically did
confess his own crime in the course of testifying against his accomplices, and
in this sense it can be said that he exchanged his confession for the prosecu-
tor's leniency.
There are, however, major distinctions. (1) The crown witness ordinarily
escaped prosecution and sanction altogether, whereas the conventional plea
bargain imposes conviction and (reduced) sentence on the culprit who con-
fesses. (2) The object of the exchange was not, as in plea bargaining, self-
incrimination, but rather the conviction of others whose actions were regarded
as more heinous than those of the crown witness. (3) It was not dysfunction in
the trial process that caused the prosecution to excuse the crown witness from
punishment, but rather inadequate evidence-gathering capacity in the pretrial
process, which is why the crown witness was already prominent in the first half
of the eighteenth century when jury trial was still a summary proceeding and
true plea bargaining still unknown.
9 See, for example, the forgery prosecution recounted in Alschuler
(supra:222-23) .
10 Casper and Zeisel (1972:146-47, 150-51). In the middle of the nineteenth
century, when German criminal procedure was being given its modern shape,
German scholars routinely studied English procedure as a reform model. They
found much to admire and to borrow (including the principle of lay participa-
tion in adjudication and the requirement that trials be conducted orally and in
public), but they were unanimous in rejecting the guilty plea. It was wrong for
a court to sentence on "mere confession" without satisfying itself of the guilt of
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common law treated confession as a waiver of trial, by contrast
with the Continental practice of viewing it as merely evidence
of the most cogent kind; as we have seen, during the centuries
when jury trial was still a summary proceeding the courts dis-
couraged defendants from entering guilty pleas. But in retro-
spect we can see that the guilty plea had an intrinsic
conveniencell that pointed the Anglo-American system to-
wards a nontrial procedure once jury trial had undergone the
transformation that stripped it of its former efficiency.
Another historical relic may also have influenced the com-
mon law in its tendency to construct the modern nontrial pro-
cedure on the basis of the accused's waiver of his right to jury
trial: the rule that the accused had to elect trial by jury and
could not be so tried without his consent. This rule, whose me-
dieval origins and fortuitous post-medieval survival are else-
where explained (Langbein, 1977:75-76), had no practical
importance so long as jury trial was still in its summary phase.
When an accused refused to elect jury trial, he would be.
pressed to death without trial; accordingly, few accused placed
much value on the right to decline. But the theory lived on,
ready for an opposite usage in a later day. When jury trial had
undergone its great transformation, the authorities would cease
coercing the accused to elect jury trial and instead-by more
polite means-they would coerce him to waive it.
the accused (Arnold, 1855:275; see also Walther, 1851; Goltdammers Archiv,
1870). .
11 This point is reinforced by Professor Cockburn's recent discovery that
common law criminal procedure experienced an earlier cycle in late Elizabe-
than times of what appears to be plea bargaining, in response to a relatively
sudden increase in felony caseloads. Working from the indictment files that
survive from the assizes held on the Home Circuit around London, Cockburn
(1978:73) finds that "[flor the first thirty years of Elizabeth's reign confessions
of guilt are virtually unknown at assizes" (as they are again by Hale's time in
the second half of the seventeenth century, see the discussion supra:264-65).
"Quite suddenly, between 1587 and 1590, 'guilty' (cognovit) becomes a routine
plea; at every assizes thereafter five or six prisoners-sometimes as many as
half the calendar-<:onfessed to their indictments and were sentenced without
further process" (ibid.). A number of indictments from this period appear to
reflect negotiated charge reductions exchanged for guilty pleas. Stolen goods
were revalued to below twelve pence, in order to bring the offense down from
grand to petty larceny. Indictments alleging burglary were revised to charge
larceny instead; "benefit of clergy" pertained to larceny, so that a first offender
would routinely escape with branding on the thumb rather than death. These
amendments were entered on the original pieces of parchment that charged the
higher offenses, doubtless to save the expense of new parchment, which is why
evidence of the practice has survived (ibid.).
Cockburn's discovery of the Elizabethan practice is too recent to have al-
lowed anyone to explore what factors subsequently relieved the pressure and
permitted substantially every case of felony to go to jury trial, as had occurred
by Hale's time. It would be necessary to study the seventeenth-century evi-
dence with a view to identifying changes in caseloads, trial management, court
time devoted to the criminal calendar, and so forth.
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C. Insistence on Jury Trial
An adaptation seemingly less radical than the nontrial pro-
cedure of plea bargaining would have been to institute trial
without jury, what we now call bench trial, in cases of serious
crime. Although it has become a familiar via media between
jury trial and the guilty plea in our own day, in the nineteenth
century bench trial was resisted. Once again we are touching
upon a subject that has not been seriously investigated in the
historical literature and can therefore address it only in outline.
In England the great political trials associated with the fall
of Stuart autocracy and the evolution of the eighteenth-century
constitution had sanctified jury trial in political theory. The
changes that were taking place within the institution of jury
trial came interstitially and were, therefore, hard for contempo-
raries to notice or evaluate. The seventeenth-century political
trials that were the source of so much of the esteem in which
the jury was held were responsible for a good deal of continu-
ing distrust for the English judiciary. The behavior of Justices
Scroggs and Jeffreys was not easily forgotten even after the in-
dependence of the judiciary was established. Blackstone, writ-
ing in the 1760s, was still worried that in misdemeanor cases
tried without a jury, the accused was exposed to the arbitrari-
ness of a single crown hireling. The accused, he warns, "is ac-
quitted or condemned by the suffrage of such person only, as
the statute has appointed for his judge" (1769:277).
In America, where the judiciary's association with the ex-
cesses of English colonial administration had led the framers to
make jury trial a constitutional right, bench .trial was all the
harder to envision. There is a splendid case from the New York
Court of Appeals in 1858 (Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128) that
illustrates the continuing force of this sentiment in the age
when plea bargaining was creeping into ordinary practice.
Some distance into a jury trial for murder, one of the twelve ju-
rors was "withdrawn" (ibid. at 130) with the written consent of
the accused, his counsel,l2 and the public prosecutor. (The re-
port does not make clear whether the juror became indisposed,
or whether he was removed for cause on a kind of delayed chal-
lenge.) The jury of eleven then proceeded to verdict, finding
the accused guilty, and he was sentenced to death. The Court
12 Where assigned counsel was not readily available, an indigent accused
in nineteenth-century America may have had a considerable incentive to plead
guilty rather than try to defend himself at trial-whether jury or
bench-against a lawyer-public prosecutor. (I owe this point to Professor Wil-
liam Nelson.)
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of Appeals reversed, reasoning that if the accused could dis-
pense with one juror, he could waive eleven; such innovation
threatened "the ancient and invaluable institution of trial by
jury ..." (ibid. at 138). Once "issue is joined on an indictment,
the trial must be by the tribunal and in the mode which the
constitution and laws provide, without any essential change"
( ibid.). However privatized the steps leading to the initiation
of criminal proceedings, the actual conduct of a criminal trial is
undertaken for public purposes. Hence, "the right of a defen-
dant in a criminal prosecution to affect, by consent, the conduct
of the case, should be much more limited than in civil actions"
ibid. at 137).
Twenty years later the Supreme Court of Connecticut con-
cluded that a statute authorizing the accused to elect bench
trial was valid under the state constitution, although it was
"unwise and impolitic . . . to place the life or liberty of any per-
son accused of crime, even by his own consent at the disposal
of anyone or two men, so long as man is a fallible being"
(State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349, 367,1878). American judges did
not welcome the responsibility for bench trial in cases of seri-
ous crime, especially in an age that still employed a good deal
of capital punishment. Commenting on the Connecticut case
early in the twentieth century, Simeon Baldwin-a sometime
Connecticut governor, supreme court justice, founding member
of the American Bar Association, and Yale law profes-
sor--emphasized what an advantage it was to have jury trial
diffuse responsibility. "Each juror is but one of twelve," and
when the twelve have convicted the accused, "the judge, for his
part, is only the channel through which the statutory penalty is
proclaimed" (1908:316).
Not only was the nontrial solution of plea bargaining more
rapid than bench trial, it also protected the weak, elective
American trial bench from the moral responsibility for adjudi-
cation and from the political liability of unpopular decisions. In
an ideological milieu in which the mounting defects of adver-
sary jury trial could not have been admitted and discussed
even if they had been correctly understood, it was easier for
the judiciary to tolerate trial waivers than jury waivers--easier,
that is, for the judges to allow the prosecutor to wring out a
plea concession than to bring themselves to insist on adjudica-
tion before condemnation.
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